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THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SCHEME OF THE FEDERAL
RULES TO THE PECULIARITIES OF MINNESOTA
PRACTICE
BENEDICT

S.

DEINARD*

L AWYERS who have not had any substantial experience under the

Federal Rules should be reassured that they comprise a workable and uncomplicated system of procedure and practice, not
radically different from the State practice with which we are so
familiar. Modernization of State practice can proceed, broadly
speaking, along the same lines, and therefore the Federal Rules
can satisfactorily be transplanted - with some adjustment, of
course-to our district courts. The Federal Rules substitute simplicity for artfulness in pleading, relying on postpleading discovery
to illuminate the issues; substitute full disclosure before trial for
suppression of the facts; and streamline procedure in many ways.
But there is no cause for alarm on the part of practitioners that
their adoption will introduce any strange heresies or mysteries into
practice in the State courts.
But to that reassurance I should like to add the following predictions on points which may be overlooked:
A. The Rules will increase the lawyers' work load in preparation of a case.
B. They will substantially increase the chambers work of the
trial judges, because they are not susceptible of automatic
application.
C. More than ever, they require an able trial judiciary.
A. The experience of lawyers handling litigation in the Federal
courts clearly indicates that the Federal Rules have increased the
lawvers' work load in preparation of their cases. It is no longer
possible to serve a complaint, read the answer, perhaps interpose
a reply, and then put the file away to rest until the clerk calls the
case for trial, meanwhile hopefully expecting that the case will be
disposed of by settlement before trial. It is no longer possible to hide
your case from view until you present it in court, and it is no longer
safe to come into court without first probing your adversary's case.
The technique of discovery has largely eliminated the possibility
of surprise; it has also made last-minute preparation for trial impossible. In fact, it is amusing that the Rules have introduced a race
for priority in discovery and inspection. When you commence a
lawsuit, you may as well be prepared to have your opponent come
*L.L.B., University of Minnesota Law School 1921, S.J.D., Harvard Law
School 1922, Member of Minnesota Bar.
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over with his answer in one hand and a notice of taking the plaintiff's deposition in the other. And only a reckless lawyer will permit
the examination of his own client without first fully preparing his
case.
No doubt discovery and the summary judgment procedure will
eliminate trial of a substantial amount of worthless or trivial
litigation. But, on the other side, it often involves dual preparation
by counsel: first, in advance of discovery proceedings, and second,
in advance of the trial. It often involves dual examination of witnesses: first, in counsel's office, and second, in open court. Pre-trial
conference may be very helpful in simplifying the issues and, eventually, in shortening a trial. But it involves time in preparation and
attendance. If you have been in the habit of starting a lawsuit
without adequate preparation on the law and facts, and then awaiting the trial calendar before spending any real time on preparation,
in the hope that somewhere along the way the case will probably
be disposed of by settlement or otherwise before you have to make
any substantial investment of time in the case, prepare to reform.
That is no longer possible.
B. The Rules substantially increase the chambers work of the
trial judges, because they are not susceptible of automatic application.
Many of the innovations introduced by the Rules involve discretionary action. One need only thumb through the first sections
of the Rules to discover that few of the Rules are capable of automatic application. They usually involve a contested hearing and
discretionary disposition by the court.'
1. Rule 4.043) Defendant served by publication may be admitted to
12.01) defend on a showing of "sufficient cause."
4.07) Court "in its discretion" may allow process to be

amended on terms.

5.01) Court may relax requirements for service if defendants
5.03) are numerous.
5.01) Court may require service upon the party instead of upon his attorney.
5.04) Court may dispense with filing of papers and may grant
continuances.
6.02) Court may enlarge time, "in its discretion," for cause
shown.
6.04) Court may change time specified for serving a motion.
7.01) Court may order a reply.
8.03) Court, "if justice requires" "on terms" may relieve
pleader of mistaken designation of answer, etc.

12.01) Court may change specified time for pleading after
motion.
12.02) Court may permit conversion of motion to dismiss or for
12.03) judgment on the pleadings, into motion for summary
judgment.
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If lawyers were all filled with sweet reasonableness, no doubt
many, if not most, interlocutory matters could be disposed of by
stipulation or informal agreement on a give and take basis. But
lawyers as a group are contentious by training, belligerent by habit,
and disputatious by nature. They often welcome an opportunity to
display their arguments. That inclination was particularly noticeable in the early years under the Federal Rules, when precedents
were scant and interpretation was limited to the notes of the Committee and the proceedings of the first Institutes. After thirteen
years, most doubtful points of construction have been authoritatively determined. But application to the facts at hand remains, commonly, a matter of judgment and discretion, for disinterested
decision. Shall a non-resident plaintiff be required to come to the
forum to give his deposition? Ordinarily yes, but circumstances
may relieve him of that obligation, and judgment requires an
examination of the peculiar facts of each case. Does "sufficient
cause," or "cause," or "good cause" exist to require or warrant
relief under Rules 4.043, 6.02, 30.02 and 34? Examples may be
multiplied, but the point need not be labored.
It is inevitable that the chambers work of the trial judges will
be substantially increased. Motions for discovery and production,
under Rule 34, to require a witness to answer, under Rule 37.01,
for protective orders under Rules 30.02 and 30.04, and similar applications may appear as frequently on the special term calendar as
motions for temporary alimony do today. Motions for summary judgment may require the examination of lengthy affidavits and even
transcripts of testimony taken on adverse examination. The elimination of trials means augmenting the volume of pre-trial hearings.
They require time for hearings and careful consideration.
C. As the area of discretion widens, so, by the same token, the
need for an able trial judiciary intensifies. For the extent of discretion exercisable by a judge is the measure of the skill required
for its judicious exercise. Under the Federal Rules, few, if any,
interlocutory orders are reviewable. Although this State's statutes
on appeals to the Supreme Court have not yet been revised, it is
plain that most discretionary orders will be reviewable, if at all,
only on appeal from a final judgment. For all practical purposes,
district court orders of a discretionary nature will be free from
challenge.2 In the Federal courts of our Division, for example, the
2. But cf. Louisell, Discovery and Pre-trialunder the Minnesota Rules,
36 Minn. L. Rev. 633, 658 (1952), where the author suggests possible review of discovery orders by use of the extraordinary remedies of prohibition
and mandamus.
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Rules have met general acceptance because they have been administered by gifted judges, notable for their tact, imagination and
realistic grasp of the problems of litigation. They will meet acceptance in the State courts if our State judges rise to the occasion.
It is axiomatic that no system of procedure can overcome the
deficiencies of an incompetent judiciary. But the rigidities of a
simple formulary system can restrain improvident action by sharply
narrowing the area of discretion. By the same token, the elastic
procedure under the new Rules aggravates the dangers of abusive
discretion in incompetent hands. Administered by an able judiciary,
the new Rules can accomplish. their high purpose (expressed in
Rule 1) : ". . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." In the hands of ill-trained and wilful judges,
they can create mischief and oppression.
The Federal Rules as amended represent a satisfactory solution to the problems relating to procedure and practice in the
Federal courts. I am not suggesting that they are above criticism.
but for the purpose of this discussion I am accepting them as being
adequate for their purposes.
The matter which is of concern to me is the adjustment of the
scheme of the Federal Rules to the peculiarities of local practice
in the State courts of Minnesota. Has the Committee adequately
considered the impact of the adoption of the Federal scheme on
the current practice Code and the decision law of Minnesota?
The Rules should simplify, clarify and improve procedure and
practice. If they introduce doubts and novel problems, to that
extent they fail of their purpose.
I.
The first question that arises is as to the scope of the Rules.
When the Federal Rules were adopted, the United States Supreme Court with meticulous care defined their applicability. Rule
81(a)'(1), for example, specifed that "These rules do not apply
to proceedings in admiralty... in bankruptcy or ... in copyright

...except insofar as they may be made applicable thereto by rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court. They do not apply to probate,
adoption or lunacy proceedings, etc." Then in the other subdivisions of Rule 81(a), the applicability or non-applicability of
the rules was spelled out with respect to borderline cases. Rule
81(b) abolished writs of scire facias and mandamus, and specified
that relief theretofore available under those writs "may be ob-
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tained by appropriate action or motion under the practice prescribed in these rules."
By subsequent amendment, the scope of the Federal Rules has
been somewhat enlarged, but little doubt as to applicability has
been left.
In the Tentative Draft of the Minnesota Rules, an effort was
made to exclude, by general formula (Tentative Rule 81.01),
"procedure and practice in any special statutory proceeding," insofar as the Rules were inconsistent or in conflict with the statutory
procedure and practice. But that effort was abandoned, and in its
place was substituted revised Rule 81.01, which specifies the excepted inconsistent "statutory proceedings" by reference to a list
in Appendix A.
The result has been to create a large area of proceedings in
which applicability of the Rules is in doubt, particularly in the field
of what are commonly known as the "extraordinary remedies."
1. ExtraordinaryRemedies.
The Rules unfortunately leave in doubt how the extraordinary
remedies are to be dealt with. They are not listed in Appendix A.
Two alternative and inconsistent interpretations are possible as to
the impact of the Rules on them:
a. That the extraordinary remedies are not "civil actions" within the scope of the Rules and, therefore, the statutory procedure and
practice in them are neither governed by nor affected by the Rules,
but remain unaffected.
b. That the extraordinary remedies are "civil actions" within
the scope of the Rules and, therefore, the existing statutes regulating
the procedure and practice in them are wholly superseded by the
Rules.
The Committee might have treated the extraordinary remedies
in a third or middle way, by adding them to the list of special proceedings enumerated in Appendix A, under Rule 81.01, thereby
preserving the statutory proceedings in them so far as inconsistent
or in conflict with the Rules, but otherwise supplementing the statutory procedure by the Rules. Evidently the middle course was considered by the Committee at one time, because habeas corpus and
mandamus are mentioned in the Tentative Draft at p. 228 as examples of such "special statutory proceedings existing today in
Minnesota." But before the final draft, the extraordinary remedies
were dropped out or forgotten.
Which of the two remaining alternative interpretations the Coin-
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mittee intended, I find it very difficult to say, because it involves
a dual semantic problem: (a) what did the legislature mean in the
Enabling Act by "civil actions"; and (b) are the extraordinary
remedies to be classified as "civil actions" in the sense of the Rules?
The Enabling Act
A plausible argument could be made in support of the position
that mandamus, habeas corpus and the other extraordinary remedies are not "civil actions" within the scope of the Act, and are,
therefore, wholly unaffected by the Rules.
The Enabling Act (§ 1) limits the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court to "civil actions."

'3

The question is presented: W\That is the precise meaning of
"civil actions" as so used in the Enabling Act? The phrase "civil
actions" is borrowed from the Minnesota statutes. Originally, at a
time when the court of chancery was a distinct tribunal in Minnesota,
it was used in the sense of a case at law commenced by summons, as
distinguished from a suit in equity commenced by chancery subpoena. That was recognized in the Territorial Act of March 5,
1853, 4 the ancestor of § 54.0141 which abolishes the distinction between "actions at law and suits in equity." 5 It declared that equity
suits and proceedings, for example mortgage foreclosures, should
be commenced and conducted "by the like process, pleadings,
trial and proceedings as in civil actions, and shall be called civil
actions." [Italics added.]
In response to a contention that the statute did no more than
change the form of process from a chancery subpoena to a summons,
Justice Mitchell pronounced that it:
"... was designed to conform, not only the form of the
process, but also the manner of its service in equity suits, to that
which obtained in all other civil actions."6 [Italics added.]
3. § 3 similarly limits the recommendatory function of the Judicial
Council, and no doubt the same limitation is inherent in the other sections,
although it should be noted that § 5, in conferring power upon any court of
the first instance to adopt supplementary rules, speaks in general terms of
"rules of court governing its practice," and in reserving the rule-making
power of statutory administrative bodies also speaks of "rules governing its
practice"; and that § 6, in providing for the present effectiveness and later
supersession of existing laws, speaks of "All present laws relating to pleading, practice and procedure" without limitation to "civil actions."
4. Collated St., Terr. of Minn. 1853, c. 9; Pub. St. 1858, c. 57, p. 480.
4a. All references in text to statutes by section number only are to
Minn. Stat., 1949.
5. Gates v. Smith, 2 M1inn. 30 (21) (1858) ; see Stone v. Bassett, 4
Minn. 298 (215) (1860).
6. Crombie v. Little, 47 Minn. 581, 585, 50 N. V. 823, 824 (1891).
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Since the abolition of the distinction between law and equity,
the statutes have identified "civil actions" as commenced by service
of summons and § 543.01 provides:
"Civil actions in the district court shall be commenced by the
service of a summons as hereinafter provided."
In H. L. Spencer Co. v. Koell it was said:
an action in this state
"There is no other way of commencing
'7
save by the service of a summons."
Therefore, traditional usage for many years has distinguished actions or suits commenced by summons ("civil actions") from proceedings otherwise commenced ("special proceedings")."
Mandamus, habeas corpus, and other extraordinary remedies
are not commenced by summons. Mandamus is commenced by the
filing of a petition, the issuance of an order for a writ and a writ,
and the service of these papers on the defendant. The writ prescribes the return day, and the court, in the writ, directs the manner of service.0 The defendants are required to show cause by
"answer made in the same manner as an answer to a complaint in a
civil action," and the answer must be interposed on the return day
of the writ "or such further day as the Court shall allow."' 1 In
Hanson v. Emanuel, an appeal in an election contest, the court, in
explaining that when a special proceeding is required to be tried
and determined as a civil action, the rules applicable to civil actions
apply, pointed out:
"Findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment
are required in mandamus which is a special proceeding in view
of the statute that it be tried as a civil action."' 1 [Italics added.]
Habeas corpus is commenced by a verified petition',2 and the
writ is granted by the judge or the court commissioner. Issues are
framed, and the matter tried in a summary way. Habeas corpus is
an ancient writ designed to test the legality of a present restraint of
petitioner's liberties. The power to issue habeas corpus is statutory,
but for a definition of the writ, resort must be had to the common
law. 13 In State v. Buckham, in holding that an order of discharge in
habeas corpus could be reviewed by appeal but not by certiorari, the
court pointed out that "Habeas corpus is a special proceeding, not
7. 91 Minn. 226, 228, 97 N. W. 974, 975 (1904).
S. Uram v. St. Mary's Russian Orthodox Church, 207 Minn. 569, 292

N. W. 200 (1940).
9. 'Minn. Stat. § 586.05 (1949).
10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid.
210 Minn. 51, 53, 297 N. W. 176,177 (1941).
'Minn. Stat. § 589.02 (1949).
See 32 Minn. L. Rev. 508 (1948).
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only because it is not an ordinary civil action, but because it is so
expressly classified in our statutes. '14 [Italics added.]
Quo warranto likewise differs from the "ordinary civil action."
Quo warranto in Minnesota is not the old common law writ, but
rather the infdrmation in the nature of quo warranto as left by the
changes brought about by 9 Anne, c. 20. Normally it is brought by
the Attorney General, but the district court has discretionary power
to grant leave to a private relator. And the statutory requirements
of service of notice of trial in ordinary civil actions, for example,
are not applicable because it is a special proceeding.' 5 And the court
has power to impose a fine against the usurper, as well as a judgment of ouster.' 6
There is also statutory justification for distinguishing special
proceedings from "civil actions." Section 484.01, defining the jurisdiction of the district courts, provides that they "shall have original
jurisdiction in all civil actions

.

.

.,

in all special proceedhigs not

exclusively cognizable by some other Court or Tribunal, and in all
other cases wherein such jurisdiction is especially conferred upon
them by law." [Italics added.]
Although it is difficult to extract a clear principle from the
statutes and dicta of the Supreme Court, it is thus at least arguable
that, according to established usage, the extraordinary remedies are
not included in the statutory or traditional meaning of a "civil
action."
It is equally arguable, however, that mandamus and the other
extraordinary remedies are to be treated as "civil actions" within
the scope of the act.
The Supreme Court has said that "mandamus has lost its original prerogative character and has become a civil action in which,
upon a proper showing, the writ ordinarily issues as a matter of
course." [Italics added.] And Dunnell states:
"In our practice, mandamus is assimilated to an ordinary
civil action."'
Even under the English practice, an application for a prerogative writ of mandamus is a civil proceeding, and is an "action"
within the British Practice Act.' 9
Similarly, it is settled in Minnesota that "habeas corpus is an
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

29 Minn. 462 (1882).
State v. Village of Kent, 96 Minn. 255, 104 N. W. 948 (1905).
Minn. Stat. § 556.05 (1949).
Dexner v. Houghton, 153 Minn. 284, 286, 190 N. W. 179 (1922).
4 Dunnell's Digest § 5767 (a) (2d ed. 1927).
Rex v. Westminister, [1917] 2 K. B. 215.

1952]
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independent proceeding to enforce a civil right. ' 20 It is "certainly
22
civil in its nature."'" It is a "civil proceeding."
In addition to the common law information in the nature of quo
warranto, there is the statutory remedy which embodies some of the
features of quo warranto informations. 23 The statutory remedy has
24
been said to be "a civil action and not a special proceeding."
The fact that extraordinary remedies are not commenced by
summons is not necessarily conclusive. The new Rules are not themselves confined to such actions as are commenced by a summons.
For example, Rule 67.02 provides for a deposit in court "when no
action is brought." Rule 27.01 permits depositions before any action
brought on the filing of a petition and the service of notice.
Outside of Minnesota, authority may be found to support each
of the alternative constructions of the term "civil actions." Thus
a glance at the authorities gathered in 55 C. J. S. (Mandamus) pp.
16-17 will show that mandamus has defied classification. Under
various statutes, in various contexts, it has been held to be and
not to be "a civil action."
"It has been said that the attempt to classify the proceeding in
mandamus is always futile, and that it is sui generis." 25
The Rules
As the arguments drawn from the statutes and decisions are thus
inconclusive, the Advisory Committee could reasonably have adopted either of the two possible constructions of the term "civil
actions" as used in the Enabling Act. The Committee, however,
has left in grave doubt whether it considered the extraordinary
remedies as "civil actions" for the purpose of the Rules.
Rule 1 declares that the rules govern the procedure "in all
suits of a civil nature, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81." It
thereby adopts the terminology of the Federal Rules. But is is clear
that the description "all suits of a civil nature" is intended to be
synonymous with "civil action," because Rule 2, borrowing the
statement from § 540.01 declares:
"There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action' ";
and Rule 3.01 provides how "a civil action" shall be commenced.
20. State v. Utecht, 206 Minn. 41, 287 N. W. 229 (1939).
21. State v. McDonald, 123 Minn. 84, 142 N. W. 1051 (1913).
22. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556 (1883), cited approvingly in

the McDonald case, note 21 supra.
23.
24.

Minn. Stat. §§ 556.01-556.13 (1949).
State v. Village of Kent, 96 Minn. 255, 268, 104 N. W. 948, 952

(1905).
25. See 55 C.J. S. 16 (1948).
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The uncertainty as to whether the term "civil action" as thus
employed extends to the extraordinary remedies is nowhere resolved in the Rules. Rule 81.01 provides that:
"These rules do not govern procedure and practice in the
statutory proceedings listed in Appendix A insofar as the
statutes are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure and
practice provided by these rules"excepting, in turn, as in Rule .81.03, any statutory provision that an
"act in a civil proceeding shall be done in the manner provided by
20
law," is made to refer to the Rules.
When we examine Appendix A, we find a number of special
statutory proceedings listed which differ from the ordinary "civil
action" in the same respects as do the extraordinary remedies, namely in that (a) they are not commenced by summons (the criterion in
§ 543.01), (b) the court's power depends upon and is limited
to the statutory grant of power, and (3) some of them have been
expressly declared not to be civil actions.
For example:
(1) A statutory election contest (c. 208).
Commenced by filing a petition in the District Court (§
208.01) or by filing and serving a written notice of the contest
(§ 208.03-208.07), which is treated 2as7 a pleading. Held a special proceeding, and not a civil action.

(2) Drainage (c. 105).
Commenced by the Commissioner filing a petition to construct a ditch, the judge appointing viewers to ascertain the
benefits and damages. Persons aggrieved may then petition
for appraisal (§ 105.13-105.20) and demand a jury trial (§
like a proceeding to estab105.24). Held, "not a civil action, but, 28
lish a highway, a special proceeding."
(3) Condemnation (eminent domain) (c. 117).
Commenced by presenting a petition to the District Court.
Notice served like a "summons in a civil action" (§ 117.05). On
appeal from an award of damages, cause to be tried by a jury
26. The Tentative Draft of :Rule 81.01 excluded "any special statutory
proceeding." In the re-draft the exceptions were limited to "the statutory proceedings listed in Appendix A," and the qualifying word "special" was
omitted. But the title of the rule, "Special Statutory Proceedings" was preserved, and Appendix A is entitled "Special Statutory Proceedings under
Rule 81.01," although in the text of the Appendix the list of statutes is described as "pertaining to special proceedings which will be excepted."
27. Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 51, 297 N. W. 176 (1941); Ford
v. Wright, 13 Minn. 518 (480), 525 (487) (1868) ; Whallon v. Bancroft,
4 Minn. 109 (70) (1860).
28. County of McLeod v. Nutter, 111 Minn. 345, 126 N. W. 1100
(1910).
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and disposed of according to the rules applicable to ordinary
civil actions. 23
(4) Adoption."
Commenced by application.
31
(5) Change of Name.
Commenced by application.
(6) Petition by mortgagor to cultivate land sold under fore32 -

closure.

Commenced by petition filed with the court in the county
wherein foreclosure is pending; petition and notice of motion
to be served like "summons in a civil action."
Applying the maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius"
as an aid to construction one might properly infer that mandamus
and the other extraordinary remedies were intended to be governed
by the Rules.
Whether such inference is warranted, however, is doubtful since
none of the statutes regulating procedure in the extraordinary
remedies are listed in either Appendix B (1) or Appendix B (2) as
"superseded," pursuant to the provisions of Rule 86.02. But appendices B(1) and B(2) may possibly have been intended as only a
partial list of those statutes superseded by operation of law. Section 6 of the Enabling Act provides for the supersession of "All
present laws .

.

. insofar as they are in conflict" with the Rules,

without any requirement of specification. That principle was recognized by the Committee in its note to Rule 1.01 in the Tentative
Draft, where it stated:
"Unless certain procedures and practices are specifically or
generally excepted in Rule 81, then these rules will be the only
rules of practice and procedure in district courts."
The procedure in mandamus, habeas corpus, quo warranto, etc.,
is in many respects inconsistent and in conflict with the procedure
and practice established by the Rules. That has already been pointed
out in discussing whether or not they are to be treated as civil
actions. On the premise that the extraordinary remedies are "civil
actions," then the Code provisions regulating them are now of "no
further force and effect." 3
Since the whole matter is inconclusive and not capable of assured answer, it would have been far better had the Committee
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Minn. Stat. § 117.14 (1949).
Minn. Stat. §§ 259.01-259.11 (1949).
Minn. Stat. §§ 259.10 and 259.11 (1949).
Minn. Stat. §§ 256.11-256.15 (1949).
Enabling Act § 6.
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recognized the extraordinary remedies as sui generis or of unique
character, 34 and therefore listed them with special statutory proceedings. The troublesome questions now presented could have
been prevented by the inclusion of the extraordinary remedies in
Appendix A.
In view of the doubt that appears to exist as to the status of the
extraordinary remedies, it is suggested that the Supreme Court
should now clarify the matter as the Federal Rules do: The Court
should either (1) now adopt a rule declaring that the extraordinary remedies are not to be governed in any respect by the new
rules, or, alternatively, should (2) amend Rule 81 to include them
in Appendix A so that the basic statutory provisions will persevere but may be supplemented by consistent provisions of the
Rules, such as the discovery provisions.
Otherwise the bar will be confronted with the riddle as to how,
for example, to commence a mandamus proceeding. Shall the
relator follow the requirements of c. 586, and file a petition, secure
an order and a writ fixing the return date, and make service in the
manner directed by the writ? Or, on the other hand, shall he prepare a complaint in the usual form, issue a summons under Rules
3.01 and 4.01, attach it to the complaint (as required by Rule 3.02)
and have it served by the Sheriff (under Rule 4.02) in the manner
prescribed for personal service under Rule 4.03?
If the defendant wants to challenge the complaint, or writ, shall
he demur as allowed by the mandamus statute, or, on the other
hand, (since Rule 7.01 abolishes demurrers) shall he make a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12.02?
If the defendant answers, may the plaintiff demur to the answer,
as permitted by our decisions under the statute, or is he limited
to making a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12.02,
or for summary judgment under Rule 56, or to strike under Rule
12.06?
The same problem will confront anyone desiring to start a
habeas corpus proceeding. Shall he file a petition as required by
§ 589, or shall he start an ordinary action as defined by the Rules?
These doubts and complexities are gratuitous and should be
removed.
2. Other Special ProceedingsNot Listed.
A revision of Rule 81.03 could remove some of the doubt that
34. See Shypulske v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45
N. W. 2d 549 (1951); In re Dissolution of E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn.
207,45 N. W. 2d 388 (1950).
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now exists as to other special proceedings not listed at all in Appendix A.
For example, the chapter on mortgage foreclosures3 5 is not so
listed nor is it included in the superseded statutes listed in Appendices B(1) and B(2). Whether or not so listed, it is covered
by the conformity provision of Rule 81.03, as to any act required
by the statute to "be done in the manner provided by law." But
§ 581.01 provides:
"Actions for foreclosure of mortgages shall be governed
by the same rules and provisions of statute as civil actions, except as in this chapter provided." [Italics added.]
There are no relevant exceptions-the later sections relating only to
sales, redemption, etc.
The question arises whether § 581.01 is a statute providing that
an act "be done in the manner provided by law" within the meaning of Rule 81.03. If it is not, the further question arises whether
§ 581.01 refers to the practice in civil actions prior to the Rules, or
the practice established by the new Rules.
On December 6, 1951, three additional items were added to
Appendix A by amendment:
(1) Ch. 217, Delinquent personal property taxes;
(2) Ch. 278, Objections and defense to real estate taxes;
(3) § 501.33-501.38, Proceedings relating to trusts.
But there are other statutory proceedings which have been
ignored that do not seem distinguishable from the listed ones, e.g.,
c. 260, proceedings in the matter of dependent, neglected and delinquent children in counties having a population of 100,000; § 555.08,
supplementary relief in declaratory judgment proceedings; and
others that a careful search of the statutes would disclose.
3. Divorces.
The chapter on divorce 36 is listed in Appendix A as one of the
"special statutory proceedings" excepted by Rule 81.01 from the
operation of the rules insofar as the statutes are inconsistent or in
conflict with them. However, to the extent that the divorce statutes
provide that "any act ...

shall be done in the manner provided by

law," the Rules are incorporated, by the express provision of Rule
81.03 .7
The first question is what provisions in the chapter on divorce
are inconsistent with the Rules?
35. Minn. Stat. § 581.01 et seq. (1949).
36. Minn. Stat. § 518.01 et seq. (1949).
37. Cf. Rule 65 which preserves the existing statutory procedure in
inj unction proceedings.
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Section 518.12 provides for thirty days to answer in a divorce
case. That is obviously in conflict with Rule 12.01 which prescribes
twenty days. Therefore, § 518.12 prevails, and a thirty-day summons remains necessary in a divorce suit.
The next question is what provisions of the Rules are consistent
and may be treated as supplementary to the statutes?
The whole discovery technique is adaptable to divorce suits,
for there is now no provision in the divorce statutes inconsistent
with it. Section 518.20, prior to its repeal by the Laws of 1951, c.
551, did provide for a limited discovery in connection with the
restoration to a wife of personal estate that has come to a husband
by reason of the marriage. It empowered the court to "require the
husband to disclose on oath what personal property has come to
him by reason of the marriage and how the same has been disposed
of and what portion thereof remains in his hands." That provision
might have been claimed to have been inconsistent with the discovery provisions of the Rules. But since the enactment of c. 551,
Laws 1951, there is no independent discovery provision in the
chapter on divorce. Therefore, there is no reason why the discovery
provisions of the Rules should not apply.
The third question is the effect of Rule 81.03.
Section 518.13 provides:
"When issue is joined, like proceedings shall be had as in
civil actions." [Italics added.]
The section does not employ the phrase "in the manner provided by
law" used in Rule 81.03; instead, it uses the phrase "proceedings
... as in civil actions."
That leaves open and free for dispute the question whether
§ 518.13 shall be deemed to refer (1) to the established procedure
"in civil actions" under the Code prior to and unaffected by the
rules, or (2) to the new procedure in "civil actions" introduced by
the rules.
That doubt should be resolved by a clarifying amendment to the
Rules. It may be done by an amendment to Rule 81.03 so that it will
read substantially as follows:
"Where any statute heretofore or hereafter enacted, whether
or not listed in Appendix A, provides that any act in a civil
proceeding shall be done 'in a manner provided by law,' or 'as
in civil actions' or 'as civil actions,' such act shall be done in
accordance with these rules."
4. Torrens Proceedings.
The question will still remain under Rule 81.03 as to the effect

19521
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of the Rules on Torrens proceedings. They are listed in Appendix A
and thereby come within Rule 81.01.
But the statutory section with respect to service of the summons, § 508.16, provides that the summons "shall be served in the
manner now provided by law for the service of a summons in a civil
action in the District Court, except as hereinafter provided." [Italics
added.] There follow provisions for serving the state by delivering
a copy to the Attorney General, who shall transmit the summons
to the county attorney; and provision for service on non-residents
by publication, etc.
Assuming that the existing provision in Rule 81.03--"shall be
done in the manner provided by law"--would cover any equivalent
statement such as is contained in the divorce statutes, or that the
suggested clarifying amendment should be adopted, the question remains would it cover a situation where the statute specifies that an
act shall be done in the manner "now provided by law?" This raises
an additional ambiguity that should be cured by amendment.
5. Superseded Statutes and Rules.
Appendix B (2), described as a "list of statutes superseded by
Rules" purports to list both the statutes and District Court Rules
thus superseded. There are obviously some statutes and District
Court Rules, however, which have not been included in Appendices B as being- superseded, and yet are superseded. Checking at
random, we find that Rule 6.01, drawn verbatim from Federal
Rule 6(a), prescribes that "When the period of time . . . is less
than seven days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall be excluded in the computation." However, § 645.16 ("computation of
time") excludes Sundays or holidays only "when the last day of
the period falls on" such a day. The Tentative Draft notes the
difference. 38 Yet § 645.16 is not listed in either Appendix.
Again, the Tentative Draft noted that District Court Rule 13
will be partly superseded by Rule 4.01 as to the form of summons,
and District Court Rule 21 by Rule 6.04, but neither District Court
Rule has been included in the Appendices.
Careful search of the Code and Court Rules should be made
to cull out unnoticed superseded items.
II.
In addition to the ambiguities as to their scope, the Rules are
38. Advisory Committee, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 36 (Tent.
Draft 1950).
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deficient in a number of other respects. Some of these deficiencies
are discussed in this and the succeeding sections of this article.
Rule 43.01 blindly follows the phraseology of the comparable
Federal Rule 39 which was intended to resolve the troublesome conflicts that arose in the Federal courts as to the admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses where there were differences
between the Federal statutes on the subject, the Federal Rules of
evidence in equity, and the practice in the state where the Federal
court was sitting. According to the Committee note 40 Rule 43.01
"adopts Federal Rule 43(a) insofar as it is applicable to state
practice" by incorporating a provision that all evidence shall be received which is admissible under:
"the statutes of this state, or under the rules of evidence
heretofore applied in the trials of actions in the courts of this
state."
To this provision is appended a verbatim quotation from the
Federal rule:
"In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception
of the evidence governs."
Adoption of the rule in Minnesota can be justified only on the
fantastic premise that heretofore there have been available in the
courts of Minnesota two conflicting and competing standards of
admissibility-one statutory, the other non-statutory; one favoring
the reception, and the other the exclusion of evidence under a given
set of circumstances. Such a premise posits some sort of transcendental common law of evidence in Minnesota, existing apart from
and independently of the statutes relating to proof.
This is not to suggest that the Federal Rule was not warranted,
although as the Committee noted there were differences of opinion
as to its effectiveness. 4 . But no doubt the situation in the Federal
courts called for correction. The rules of evidence in chancery
varied somewhat from the rules of the common law.4 2 In addition,
the rules of evidence in equity in the Federal courts somewhat
varied from the local state rules. In common law trials under the
Conformity Act, in the absence of a Federal statute, the state rule
including statutory rules governed. But a Federal statute, if there
were one, prevailed over the state rule upon the same subject. There
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 (a).
40. Advisory Committee, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 150 (Tent.
Draft 1950).
41. See 1Wigmore, Evidence 199-204 (3d ed. 1940).
42. 1 id. at 14-16.
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were, thus in the Federal courts competing rules as to admissibility,
and great confusion as to which body of law, state or Federal, should
govern in a particular case.43
But that situation never existed in Minnesota. In the state courts
of Minnesota, there has never been more than one standard of admissibility. The statutes are supreme except as restrained by the
State or Federal Constitution. Of course, there may be alternative
modes of proof. For example, an account book may be more easily
established by recourse to the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act4 than by the Shop-Book statute, 4 while the same account
book may be proved under common law rules without the benefit
of any statute. But that simply means that these modes of proof
are complementary-not that there are competing grounds of ad4
missibility. "
The reductio ad absurdumn appears in the final sefitence, as to
the competency of witnesses, likewise quoted verbatim from the
Federal Rule:
"The competency of a witness shall be determined in like
manner."
For the competency of a witness in Minnesota is purely statutory,
and every witness of sufficient understanding is competent unless
some statutory disqualification exists. 4
But assuming that there be some underlying common-law test
of competency in Minnesota, and that a statute such as the Dead
Man's statute4 creates incompetency, does the Rule seriously mean
that the statutory disqualification is to be abolished, and that, despite
the statutory disqualification, the witness becomes competent again?
Section 595.02 prohibits examination of a clergyman as to
confessions to him in his professional character. The statute created
a privilege where the common law recognized none.4 9 Does the
Rule seriously intend that the privilege shall now be abolished?
A provision meaningful in relation to the Federal courts has
been pointlessly added in a context where it is, at the best, devoid
of meaning, or, at the worst, mischievous.
43. 1id. at 171 et seq.

44. Minn. Stat. §§ 600.01-600.04 (1949).
45. Minn. Stat. § 600.05 (1949).
46. That principle is given express recognition by the new rules in the

case of official records. See Rule 44.
47. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
48. Minn. Stat. § 595.04 (1949).
49. In re Contempt of Emil Swanson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589
(1931).
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III.
Rule 54.04 provides that "Costs and disbursements may be
taxed by the Clerk on two days' notice." It contains no provision
for taxation ex parte in a default case. Neither does § 549.10,
from which that portion of the Rule is drawn, and which is superseded by it.
The Rules expressly made applicable to default judgments have
been taken from the Federal Rules without regard to the different
meanings given the term "costs" in Federal and local Minnesota
practice. Rule 55.01, subparagraph (1), provides that in a default
case "upon a contract for the payment of money only" the Clerk
upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for the
amount due "and costs against the defendants."
The phrase "and costs against the defendants" is taken
verbatim from Federal Rule 55(b) (1) and is broad enough to
cover all taxable costs and disbursements in federal practice. It is
at least doubtful whether it is broad enough to cover disbursements
under the Minnesota practice.
The predecessor Minnesota statute § 544.07, now superseded,
contained no provision for costs. It provided, in case of default:
"(1) If the action be upon contract for the payment of money
only, the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount stated in the
summons." [Italics added.]
Costs recoverable on a default judgment of $100.00 or more in an
action for the recovery of money only, amount to $5.00 under
§ 549.01. Rule 55.01 makes no mention of disbursements, although
the prevailing party is entitled to them in a default case as in a
contested case under § 549.04.
Again, Rule 5.01 specifies that "no service need be made on
parties in default for failure to appear" except pleadings asserting
new or additional claims for relief.
That leaves open the question as to whether Rule 54.04 was intended and will be interpreted as applying to default cases, and
requiring notice in order to permit the prevailing party to recover
costs and/or disbursements.
IV.
Rule 58.01 introduces a combination of the existing Code provision on entry of judgment50 with Federal Rule 58. The third and
fourth sentences attempt a merger of the provisions of both: the
50. Minn. Stat. § 548.03 (1949).
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first clause of the third sentence and the fourth sentence are verbatim copies of the first two sentences in § 548.03, while the second
clause of the third sentence is a variant of the provision in the Federal Rule that "The notation of a judgment in the civil docket as
provided by Rule 79(a) constitutes the entry of the judgment; and
the judgment is not effective before such entry,"--for which Rule
58.01 substitutes "this entry constitutes the entry of the judgment;
and the judgment is not effective before such entry." In the Tentative Draft, the Committee noted that "the notation of judgment
provision has been modified to conform to Sec. 548.03."51
The problem arises, how will Rule 58.01 affect Minnesota law?
Under § 548.03, it has been established that there is no judgment
prior to the entry of the judgment by the clerk in the judgment book,
and that the statute wiped out in Minnesota the common law distinction between rendition of judgment and entry of judgment, excepting for two cases:
(1) A judgment lien employed for redemption purposes, was
not subject to attack for failure of the clerk to enter it in the judgment book, if it appeared in the judgment roll and was otherwise
regular ;2 (2) A nic pro tunc entry of judgment is permissible
where a judgment is actually "rendered" by the court but not
correctly entered, through clerical error. In HampshireArms Hotel
Co. v. Wells, the court said:
"A court can give effect to a judgment as of an earlier time
only when the judgment was rendered at that time."53 [Italics
added.]
But by "render," evidently the court meant "intended to be entered"
by the judge.
It may well be that Rule 58.01 may have repealed these exceptions without intending to, and without accomplishing any useful purpose. It is true that Rule 60.01 permits the correction of
clerical errors in judgments as well as in orders, but that may
not reach the point as to the court's power to correct the judgment
nunc pro tunc. The borrowing from the Federal rule was unnecessary to clarify the provisions of § 548.03, and introduces possible
confusion. It should be deleted.
51. Advisory Committee, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 196 (Tent
Draft 1950).
52. Clark v. Butts, 73 finn. 361, 76 N. W. 199 (1898).
53. 210 Mlinn. 286, 288, 298 N. W. 452, 453 (1941).
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Under the statute regulating appeals to the Supreme Court,"
an order sustaining a demurrer is appealable.; Even where right
to demur is only impliedly conferred, the order is appealable. 0
Rule 7.01 abolishes the demurrer, and Rule 12.02 substitutes
a motion to dismiss. There is no statute at present authorizing an
appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss or, on certificate,
from an order denying such motion. An order of dismissal is but an
order upon which judgment may be entered, and appeal must be
from the judgment under § 605.09(1), excepting where the dismissal is for want of jurisdiction. In the latter case, appeal will lie
under § 605.09(4), because the order "in effect determines the
action, and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be
taken.

57

Similarly, an order denying motion to dismiss for laches

is not appealable.58
Will the court treat the statute granting the right to appeal
from an order sustaining a demurrer (§ 605.09(4) ) as equivalently
applicable to an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule
12.02? Or will the court treat an order of dismissal as non-appealable, and to that extent abolish the present system of dual appeal,
leaving available only an appeal from the judgment? The Enabling
Act specifies that the rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the
substantive right of any litigant." 59 Right to appeal is a substantive
right in Minnesota which, therefore, cannot be impaired by the
Rules. But an existing mode of appeal is not a substantive right,
and, therefore, no doubt, preservation of a dual system of appeals
from orders and judgments is not required. Moreover, on an appeal
from a judgment "any intermediate orders involving the merits"
may be reviewed ;6o in other words, appeal from a judgment presents the case in its broadest aspect. Therefore, either interpretation
is permissible.
Certainly, the bar is entitled to have the matter clarified.
54. Minn. Stat. § 605.09 (1949).

55. Also, an order overruling if certified. Minn. Stat. § 605.09(4)
,(1949) ; Sandy v. Walter Butler, Shipbuilders, 221 Minn. 215, 21 N. W. 2d

612 (1946). Otherwise the district court cannot certify important and

doubtful questions to the Supreme Court. Newton v. Mpls. Street Ry., 185
Minn. 189, 240 N. W. 470 (1932).
56. State v. Cook, 119 Minn. 407, 138 N. W. 432 (1912).
57. Jones v. Rahilly, 16 Minn. 177 (155) (1870) ; Bulau v. Bulau, 208
Minn. 529, 294 N. W. 845 (1940).
58. Dody v. Peterson, 219 Minn. 198, 17 N. W. 2d 322 (1945).
59. Minn. Laws 1947, c. 498, § 1.
60. Minn. Stat. § 605.09(1) (1949).
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VI.
Rule 4.04 provides for substituted service or for constructive
service, in five listed cases. It has no counterpart in the Federal
Rules. It combines, modifies and supersedes §§ 543.11 and 543.12.
By combining them, it is reverting to the original text; both sections
were originally contained in a single section. However, the unfortunate result is to preserve outmoded and inadequate statutory
requirements, and also to preserve the incompatible catalogue of
cases recited in § 543.12.
The useless provision in § 543.11 for "return not found" has
been omitted, but an affidavit is still required, "stating the existence
of one of such cases and that he believes the defendant is not a
resident of the state, or cannot be found therein." The statement of
belief as to non-residence, etc., is tautological as to cases (1) and (2),
because a statement of "the existence of one of such cases" necessarily includes a statement either that the defendant, a resident,
has "departed from the state, etc.," or "keeps himself concealed
therein, etc." (Case (1)), or that the defendant, a resident, "has
departed from the state, or cannot be found therein" (Case
(2) (a)), or that the defendant "is a non-resident individual, or a
foreign corporation, etc." (Case (2) (b)). The last sentence of the
first paragraph of the Rule equates "personal service of such summons without the state," with publication. No doubt this means that
the summons served shall be accompanied by the complaint as required by Rule 3.02, but the usage may easily be misleading.
The five cases in which jurisdiction can be secured by substituted service or by constructive service under Rule 4.04 also continue the incompatible catalogue of cases under superseded § 543.12
and predecessor statutes, including one justifiable case of jurisdiction in personam, one unjustified attempt to exercise jurisdiction
in personam, one case of jurisdiction quasi-in-rem, and three cases
of in rem proceedings-all lumped together.
The statute of 18661 contained five cases:
1. Where defendant is
A. A foreign corporation
B. With property in the state (same as § 543.12(1)).
2. Where defendant is
A. A resident, who
B. Has either
(1) Departed from the state, or
61. Gen. Stat. 1866, c. 66, § 49.
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(2) Keeps himself concealed therein,
C. Intending either
(1) To defraud his creditors, or
(2) To avoid service (same as first half of § 543.12(2)).
3. Where defendant is
A. A non-resident having
B. Property in the state and
C. The action arises on contract, and
D. The Court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action
(same as § 543.12(3) except for the elimination of (C)).
4. Action for divorce (same as first half of § 543.12 (4), excepting
for the addition of the requirement of an order for service by
publication).
5. Where
A. The subject of the action is real or personal property in
the state and
B. Either
(1) Defendant has or claims a lien or interest in it or
(2) Relief is to exclude the defendant therefrom (same
as § 543.12(5)).
It is clear that taken alone, case (1) was quasi-in-rem, jurisdiction being grounded only upon ownership of property in the state
by the foreign corporation-not upon the foreign corporation transacting business in the state. 12

Case (2) was in personam, grounded on residence and permitting publication as substituted service.
Case (3) was quasi-in-rem or in rem.
Case (4) was in rem.
Case (5) was in rem.
However, the 1866 statute required not only proof by a sheriff's
return "not found" that "the defendant cannot be found within the
62. It is true that the statute did not expressly state that a lien had to
be obtained, but that is implicit from a consideration of the history of the
provision as to acquiring jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Under the
territorial laws there was no provision for serving a summons on a foreign
corporation except by publication,--the general provision for service being
held inapplicable on the theory that foreign corporations can have no existence in Minnesota. Sullivan v. LaCrosse Co., 10 Minn. 386 (308) (1865).
But in the General Statutes of 1866, a provision for serving foreign corporations by serving an officer, director or managing agent was added, but only
"when it has property within this state, or the cause of action arose therein."
Since service by publication was permissible only .on a showing that the
defendant could not be found in the state, it seems clear that personal jurisdiction of foreign corporations could not be obtained by publication.

1952]
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state"-but also an affidavit that plaintiff or his attorney "believes
that the defendant is not a resident of the state, and cannot be found
therein." [Italics added.]
The latter requirement was plainly in direct opposition to case
(2), which depended on residence. The requirement for the dual
showing was accordingly amended to cast it in the disjunctive, so
that the affidavit could properly include a resident who could not be
personally served within the state.
Later the second half of § 543.12(2) was added. It provides for
jurisdiction quasi-in-rem, and not in personam, as to a resident who
cannot be served in the state, but who has property subject to
seizure. It covers a case
6. Where defendant is
A. A resident who
B. Has either
(1) Departed from the state, or
(2) Cannot be found therein and
C. Has property or credits therein on which plaintiff has
acquired a garnishment or attachment lien.
This case constituted a confusing addition because requirements
A and B are adequate to ground in personam jurisdiction and are
the equivalent of case (2) under the 1866 statute, and the attachment or garnishment lien can be acquired without resorting to the
lien as ground for jurisdiction. Similarly the foreclosure provision
which appears as § 543.12(6) merely duplicates case (5), with
special reference to real estate mortgages and liens.
These six cases are set forth in superseded § 543.12 as follows:
"Such service [service by publication] shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction:
(1) When the defendant is a foreign corporation, having
property within the state;
(2) When the defendant, being a resident of the state, has
departed therefrom with intent to defraud his creditors, or to
avoid service, or keeps himself concealed therein with like intent;
or has departed therefrom, or cannot be found therein, and has
property or credits therein upon which the plaintiff has acquired
a lien by attachment or garnishment;
(3) When the defendant is not a resident of the state, but
has property therein, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action:
(4) When the action is for a divorce, or a separation from
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bed and board, and the court shall have ordered that service
be made by published notice;
(5) When the subject of the action is real or personal property within the state, in or upon which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, or the relief demanded consists wholly
or partly in excluding him from any such interest or lien;
(6) When the action is to foreclose a mortgage or to enforce
a lien on real estate."
Rule 4.04 varies the cases set out in § 543.12 as follows:
Case (1) under Rule 4.04 replaces the first half of § 543.12
(2) ;
Case (2) (a) replaces the second half of § 543.12(2)
Case (2) (b) replaces bcoth §§ 543.12(1) and 543.12(3), removing from (3) the requirement "the Court has jurisdiction
of the subject of the action" and limiting (1) by the requirement that an attachment or garnishment lien be acquired on the
foreign corporation's property;
Case (3) replaces § 543.12(4), with separate maintenance
substituted for separation from bed and board;
Case (4) replaces § 543.12(5) ;
Case (5) replaces § 54.3.12(6).
Case (1) is justifiable only on the understanding that it provides means for obtaining in personam jurisdiction. It allows substituted service upon residents, over whom the court can exercise
personal jurisdiction because they are residents. In lieu of personal
service within the state by "delivering a copy" of the summons to
the defendant "personally or leaving" it at his usual place of abode,
etc., pursuant to Rule 4.03 (a), the summons may be published or
served personally without the state. That is, as to residents, a form
of substituted service by which jurisdiction is acquired in personam.
It is distinguishable from "constructive, not personal, service,"
which can be had on non-residents in actions quasi-in-rem.e 3
As to a non-resident, of course, the availability of property in
the state for seizure in an indispensable requirement. Thus, if an
action for divorce goes beyond the dissolution of the res (the
marital status), and attempts to impose a judgment for alimony,
it becomes either an action in personam (in which case service by
publication can be justified only on the ground of residence plus
inability to make personal service because the resident has departed
63. Pomeroy v. National City Company, 209 Minn. 155, 164, 296 N. "WV.
513,516 (1941).
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or is concealed), or an action quasi-in-rem, limited to the property
seized." 4
Case (2) is an action quasi-in-rem, where jurisdiction, in the
absence of a voluntary general appearance, is limited to the property
seized, and service by publication is not for the purpose of acquiring personal or unlimited jurisdiction, but merely for the purpose
of giving notice sufficient to satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process. It is an improvement over the superseded statute inasmuch as it avoids the confusion in § 543.12 of combining in personam and quasi-in-rem cases in a single bracket, and also clarifies
the ground for publishing a summons against a foreign coporation.
Case (3) preserves a confusion inherent in § 543.12(4). An
action for separate maintenance in Case (3) contemplates jurisdiction in personam, but it is defective for failure to state the
indispensable requirement of residence or domicile in the state. An
action for separate maintenance is not quasi-in-rem unless the
husband has property within the state which can be reached by
process.6 Without basis in domicile or residence of the defendant,
there is no apparent ground for securing in personam jurisdiction
by constructive service in such cases. The divorce action in Case
(3), however, is a true in rem proceeding, with the marital status as
the res in the state of the domicile of the parties. Prior to the
abolition of "separation from bed and board" in 1933, such separations were coupled with divorces in Case (3), but "separate maintenance" has been substituted by the Rules. 68
Cases (4) and (5) are also true in rem proceedings.
Case (5) preserves an unnecessary duplication, as to a specialized case, viz., foreclosure of real estate mortgage and enforcement
of a real estate lien. If the duplication is to be preserved, there is no
apparent reason why foreclosure of chattel mortgages and enforcement of other chattel liens should not be included. It may have been
thought that since in Minnesota a chattel mortgage cannot be foreclosed until the chattel mortgagee has secured possession of the
mortgaged property (normally through replevin), that a chattel
64. Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 399, 161 N. W. 148, 149 (1917).
65. Pye v. Magnuson, 178 Minn. 531, 227 N. W. 895 (1929).
66. Limited divorces from bed and board were abolished by Minn.

Laws 1933, c. 165. Before 1933, the courts, without statutory authority,
recognized the right of a wife living apart to separate maintenance. Baier

v. Baler, 91 Minn. 165, 97 N. W. 671 (1903). Minn. Laws 1933, c. 165 did
not abolish such suits for separate maintenance. Barich v. Barich, 201 Minn.
34, 275 N. NV. 421 (1937). In such a suit, the court may give judgment against
the attached property of a non-resident defendant. Pye v. Magnuson, 178
Minn. 531, 227 N. W. 895 (1929).
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mortgage foreclosure was, in any event, covered by case (4). But,
by the same token, it is clear that a real estate foreclosure is likewise
comprehended within case (4) .r Therefore, both types of foreclosure stand on the same basis. That the Minnesota courts can constitutionally proceed in rem or quasi-in-rem as to chattels located
within the state is settled."" If Case (5) is to be enlarged as suggested, by including chattel liens, then there should be an equivalent
amendment of Rule 4.041, so that the summons, if published, will
indicate what chattel property is involved.
Apart from the incompatibility and duplication of cases, there
are several confusing items. As a condition of service by publication
in any of the five cases, plaintiff or his attorney must file an affidavit
with the court stating the "existence of one of such cases." Case (3)
of the Rule, however, contains a requirement that "the court shall
have ordered that service be made by published notice," an order
which can only be entered puTsuant to written motion tinder Rule
7.02. There is a duplication of showing, first by motion and then by
affidavit. The showing would have to be the same in each case, for
the court would hardly order service by publication without a
showing that the defendant is a non-resident who cannot be served
in the normal way within the state. In fact, former District Court
Rule 9(c) required a showing of "what efforts have been made
to ascertain the residence of the defendant for the purpose of making personal service." This duplication should be eliminated.
Another confusing item has been preserved. Section 518.09 provides that "an action for divorce or separate maintenance may be
brought by a wife in her own name." But § 518.11 in the chapter
on divorces, which provides For personal service out of the state,
is apparently applicable only to divorce actions. It makes no reference to separate maintenance. It provides that:
"If personal service cannot well be made, the Court may
order service of the summons by publication, which publication
shall be made as in other actions."
With reference to personal service of a divorce summons out of
the state, the Supreme Court in Bunderman v. Bunderman8 has
held that it is unnecessary -o comply with the requirements of
§ 543.11 (now Rule 4.04) by securing a return not found or filing
an affidavit, despite the fact that § 543.12(4) expressly covered an
67. Crombie v. Little, 47 Mirn. 581, 585, 50 N. W. 823, 824 (1891).

68. First Trust Company of St. Paul v. Nfatheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246
N. W. 1 (1932).
69. 117 Minn. 366, 135 N. W. 998 (1912).
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"action for divorce." Since the requirement for return not found
has been eliminated, there is no difficulty about that. But the problem remains with respect to the affidavit required by Rule 4.04.
Since the chapter on divorce, insofar as it prescribes a conflicting or inconsistent procedure, is excepted from the Rules, presumably the Bunderman case will still be law, and it will be unnecessary to file an affidavit or otherwise follow the requirements
of Rule 4.04 in a divorce action, if service is by personal service
outside the state. On the other hand, if the action is for divorce
but service is to be made by publication, an affidavit will have to be
filed and the other requirements of Rule 4.04 followed7 0
But if the action is for separate maintenance, the plaintiff will
not be relieved from following the requirements of Rule 4.04,
whether he is making service personally out of the state or by publication. And, furthermore, unless the defendant is a resident, the
plaintiff cannot expect to secure in personam jurisdiction. Even if
the defendant is a resident, a question will,arise as to whether or not
Rule 4.04 has supplied the necessary technique for securing such
jurisdiction as procedural due process may allow.
The confusion is accentuated by the fact that the first paragraph of Rule 4.04 declares "personal service . . .without the
state" to be the equivalent of publication. But when we come to
Case (3), such service is made proper only when the court shall
have ordered "that service be made by published notice." "What
point can there be in procuring an order for publication as -a basis
for making personal service outside of the state?
As to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, other means of securing a lien
than garnishment and attachment should be recognized, e.g., a lien
secured in a creditor's suit.
VII.
Rule 8.03 is a verbatim copy of Federal Rule 8(c). It lists the
affirmative defenses that must be specially pleaded. The Committee
note indicates, by quoting a note of the Judicial Council, that the
Rule "will not change present judicial rules. ' 71 1 Certainly that statenient is too broad with respect to the plea of illegality. For it has
been settled in Minnesota that the defense of illegality can be
72
raised under a general denial or by the court on its own motion.
70. Pugsley v. Magerfleisch, 161 Minn. 246, 201 N. W. 323 (1924).
71. Advisory Committee, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 48 (Tent
Draft 1950).
72. Halos v. Nachbar, 196 Minn. 387-390, 265 N. W. 26-27 (1936);
Vos v. Albany Co., 191 Minn. 197, 203, 253 N. W. 549, 550 (1934).
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Furthermore, in replevin cases, a so-called "affirmative defense"including, no doubt, illegality-may be shown under a general
7 3

denial.

It is true that the new Rules nowhere mention replevin.7 4 But
Rule 64 preserves "all remedies providing for seizure of person or
property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment
ultimately to be entered in the action ...

under the circumstances

and in the manner provided by the law of the state." It may well
be that replevin cases should be conformed to the practice in other
civil actions, but there is no reason to believe that replevin has been
abolished as a remedy.
Moreover, in at least one other respect, Rule 8.03 apparently
does not reflect the existing rules of pleading with respect to fraud.
The Supreme Court, while recognizing that fraud is ordinarily
"new matter to be specially pleaded and is inadmissible under a
general denial," has established that this principle has no application "where a written instrument is introduced in support of a
general allegation not disclosing its existence." In such a case, the
opposing party need not anticipate its production, and when confronted with it can show fraud without having pleaded it.75 Rule
8.03 does not indicate whether that judge-made rule has been preserved.
VIII.
Rule 45.03 requires personal service of a subpoena. The Committee noted 8 that the Rule supercedes § 596.02, which permits substituted service in the same manner as a summons. The
Committee regretfully noted "It appears that the present statute is
as fully desirable and gives a slightly broader method of service."
It seems unfortunate that for the mere purpose of conformity
to the Federal Rule77 a useful provision for substituted service
should have been abandoned. In the case of an unwilling or recalcitrant witness, the substituted service of a subpoena appears
to be a necessity.
73. 5 Dunnell's Digest § 8412 (2d ed. 1927) ; Walker v. Ward, 104 Minn.
386, 116 N. W. 647 (1908) (fraud); Adamson v. Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448, 48
N. W. 185 (1891) (usury).
74. Minn. Stat. § 565.01 et seq. (1949) (Claim and Delivery).
75. Turner v. Edwards, 207 Minn. 455, 457, 292 X. AV. 257, 258 (1940).
76. Advisory Committee, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 158 (Tent.
Draft 1950).
77. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (c).
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ADJUSTMENT OF FEDERAL RULES

IX.
There has been an ineffective attempt to adopt the Federal practice as to the immediate and automatic entry of judgment upon
entry of verdict or findings. Rule 58.01 was designed, according to
the Committee note, to adopt Federal rule 58.
But Rule 58.02 nullifies the effectiveness of the practice by proriding for a stay of entry of judgment, in accordance with the customary practice before the Rules. Apparently, in actual practice, the
question now asked of counsel upon submission of the case, "Do
you agree upon a stay?" will still be asked; stay will be entered;
and Rule 58.01 will become ineffective.
CONCLUSION

What has been said suggests some of the problems which may
arise in the effort to adapt the Federal Rules to the peculiarities of
Minnesota practice. Only experience under the new Minnesota
Rules will prove to what extent amendments may be required. It
seems clear, however, that much unnecessary litigation as to the
scope and application of the Rules could be avoided if the Rules were
appropriately amended now.

